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JOHN A. CUMMINGS v. THE STATE OF MISSOURI.
Held, by the minority of the court, that the Act of Congress of January 24th
1865, prescribing an oath to be taken by attorneys, is not unconstitutional, nor is
it void as being either a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law, its purpose being
to require loyalty as one of the qaalifications of those who practise law in the
national courts, and not to impose a punishment for past acts of disloyalty.
The provisions of the National Constitution forbidding Congress and the states
from passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, discussed, illustrated, and
applied, by MILER, J.

THE first case' arose on motion for leave to practise as an
attorney. The second came up on a writ of error to the Supreme
Court of Missouri.
A MILLER, J., dissenting :

I dissent from the opinions of the court just announced.
It may be hoped that the exceptional circumstances which give
present importance to these cases will soon pass away, and that
those who make the laws both state and national, will find in the
conduct of the persons affected by the legislation just declared to
be void, sufficient reason to repeal, or essentially modify it.
For the speedy return of that better spirit, which shall leave
us no cause for such laws, all good men look with anxiety, and
with a hope, I trust, not altogether unfounded.
But the question involved, relating as it does to the right of
the legislatures of the nation, and of the state, to exclude from
-offices and places of high public trust, the administration of whose
functions is essential to the very existence of the government,
those among its own citizens who have been engaged in a recent
effort to destroy that government by force, can never cease to be
one of profound interest.
It is at all times the exercise of an extremely delicate power
for this court to declare that the Congress of the nation, or the
legislative body of a state, has assumed an authority not belonging to it, and by violating the Constitution has rendered void its
attempt at legislation. In the case of an act of Congress, which
expresses the sense of the members of a co-ordinate department
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of the government, as much bound by their oath of office as we
are to respect that Constitution, and whose duty it is, as much as
it is ours, to be careful that no statute is passed in violation of it,
the incompatibility of the act with the Constitution should be so
clear as to leave little reason for doubt, before we pronounce it to
be invalid.
Unable to see this incompatibility, either in the Act of Congress
or in the provision of the constitution of Missouri, upon which
this court has just passed, but entertaining a strong conviction
that both were within the competency of the bodies which enacted
them, it seems to me an occasion which demands that my dissent
from the judgment of the court, and. the reasons for that dissent,
should be placed on its records.
In the comments which I have to make upon these cases, I
shall speak 'of principles equally applicable to both, although I
shall refer more directly to that which involves the oath required
of attorneys by the Act of Congress, reserving for the close some
remarks more especially applicable to the oath prescribed by the
constitution of the state of Missouri.
The Constitution of the United States makes ample provision
for the establishment of courts of justice to administer her laws,
and to protect and enforce the rights of her citizens. Article
III., section 1, of that instrument says : that " the judicial power
.of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." Section 8 of article I. closes its enumeration of the powers conferred on Congress by the broad declaration
that it shall have authority "1to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the
government of the United States, or in any department thereof."
Under these provisions Congress has ordained and established
Circuit Courts, District Courts, and Territorial Courts, and has
by various statutes fixed the number of the judges of the Supreme
Court. It has limited and defined the jurisdiction of all these,
and determined the salaries of the judges who hold them. It has
provided for their necessary officers, as marshals, clerks, prosecuting attorneys, bailiffs, commissioners, and jurors. And by
the Act of 1789, commonly called the Judiciary Act, passed by
the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, it is among
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other things enacted : that " in all the courts of the United States,
the parties may plead and manage their causes personally, or by
the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as, by the rules
of the said courts respectively, shall be permitted to manage and
conduct causes therein."
It is believed that no civilized nation of modern times has been
without a class of men intimately connected with-the courts, and
with the administration of justice, called variously attorneys,
counsellorsi solicitors, proctors, and other terms of similar import.
The enactment which we have just cited recognises this body of
men, and their utility in the judicial system of the United States,
and imposes upon the courts the duty of providing rules, by which
persons entitled to become members of this class may be permitted to exercise the privilege of managing- and conducting
causes in these courts. They are as essential to the successful
working of the courts, as the clerks, sheriffs, and marshals, and
perhaps as the judges themselves, since no instance is known of a
court of law without a bar. The right to practise law in the courts as a profession: is a
privilege granted by the law, under such limitations or conditions
in each state or government as the law-making power may prescribe. It is a privilege, and not an absolute right. The distinction may be illustrated by the difference between the right of
a party to a suit in court to defend his own cause, and the right
of another to appear and defend for him. The one, like the right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is inalienable. The
other is the privilege conferred by law on a person who complies
with the prescribed conditions.
Every state in the Union, and every civilized government, has
-laws by'which the right to practise in its courts may be granted,
and makes that right to depend on the good moral character and
professional skill of the party on whom the privilege is conferred.
This is not only true in reference to the first grant of license to
practise law, but the continuance of the right is made by these
laws to depend upon the continued possession of those qualities.
Attorneys are often deprived of this right upon evidence-of bad
moral character, or specific acts of immorality or dishonesty,
which show that they no longer possess the requisite qualifications.
All this is done by law, either statutory or common, and
whether the one or the other, equally the expression of legislative
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will, for the common law exists in this country only as it is
adopted or permitted by the legislatures, or by constitutions.
No reason is perceived why this body of men, in their important relations to the courts of the nation, are not subject to the
action of Congress, to the same extent that they are under legis'
lative control in the states, or in any other government; and to
the same extent that the judges, clerks, marshals, and other officers of the court are subject to congressional legislation. Having
the power to establish the courts, to provide for and regulate the
practice in those courts, to create their officers and prescribe their
functions, can it be doubted that Congress has the full right to
prescribe terms for the admission, rejection, and expulsion of attorneys, and for requiring of them an oath, to show whether they
have the proper qualifications for the discharge of their duties ?
The act which has just been declared to be unconstitutional is
nothing more than a statute which requires of all lawyers who
propose to practise in the national courts, that they shall take the
same oath which is exacted of every officer of the government,
civil or military. This oath has two aspects-one which looks to
the past conduct of the party, and one to his future conduct-but
both have reference to his disposition to support or to overturn
the government, in whose functions he proposes to take part. .In
substance, he is required to swear that he has not been guilty of
treason to that government in the past, and that he will bear
"faithful allegiance to it in the future.
That fidelity to the government under which he lives, a true
and loyal attachment to it, and a sincere desire for its preservation, are among the most essential qualifications which should be
required in a lawyer, seems to me to be too clear for argument.
The history of the Anglo-Saxon race shows that, for ages past,
the members of the legal profession have been powerful for good
or evil to the government. They are, by the nature of their
duties, the moulders of public sentiment on questions of government, and are every day engaged in aiding in the construction
and enforcement of the laws. From among their numbers are
necessarily selected the judges who expound the laws and the
Constitution. To suffer treasonable sentiments to spread here
uncheeked, is to permit the stream on which the life of the nation
depends to be poisoned at its source.
In illustration of this truth, I venture to affirm, that if all the
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members of the Iegal profession in the states lately in insurrection
had possessed the qualification of a loyal and faithful allegiance
to the government, we should have been spared the horrors of that
rebellion. If, then, this qualification be so essential in a lawyer,
it cannot be denied that the statute under consideration was eminently calculated to secure that result.
The majority of this court, however, do not base their decisions
on the mere absence of authority in Congress, and in the states,
to enact the laws which are the subject of consideration, but
insist that the Constitution of the United States forbids, in prohibitory terms, the passage of such laws, both to the Congress
and to the states. The provisions of that instrument, relied on
to sustain this doctrine, are those which forbid Congress and the
states, respectively, from passing bills of attainder and ex post
facto laws. It is said that the Act of Congress, and the provision of the constitution of the state of Missouri under review,
are in conflict with both these prohibitions, and are therefore
void.
I will examine this proposition, in reference to these two
clauses of the constituti6n, in the order in which they occur in
that instrument.
1. In regard to bills of attainder, I am not aware of any judicial decision by a court of Federal jurisdiction which undertakes
to give a definition of that term. We are therefore compelled to
recur to the bills of attainder passed by the English Parliament,
that we may learn so much of their peculiar characteristics, as
will enable us to arrive at a sound conclusion, as to what was
intended to be prohibited by the constitution.
The word attainder is derived, by Sir Thomas Tomlins, in his
Law Dictionary, from the words- attincta and attinctura, and is,
defined to be " the stain or corruption of the blood of a criminal
capitally condemned; the immediate inseparable consequence of
the common law, on the pronouncing the sentence of death."
The effect of this corruption of the blood was, that the party
attainted lost all inheritable quality, and could neither receive
nor transmit any property or other rights by inheritance.
This attainder, or corruption of blood, as a consequence of
judicial sent.ence of death, continued to be the law of England,
in all cases of treasoin, to the time that our constitution was
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framed, and, for aught that is known to me, is the law of that
country, on condemnation for treason, at this day.
Bills of attainder, therefore, or acts of attainder, as they were
called after they were passed into statutes, were laws which
declared certain persons attainted, and their blood corrupted s6
that it had lost all heritable quality. Whether it declared other
punishment or not, it was an act of attainder if it declared. this.
This also seems to have been the main feature at which the
authors of the constitution were directing their prohibition; for
after having, in article I., prohibited the passage of bills of
attainder-in section 9 to Congress, and in section 10 to the
states-there still remained to the judiciary the power of declaring attainders. Therefore, to still further guard, against this
odious form of punishment, it is provided, in section 8 of article
I.,
concerning the judiciary, that, while Congress shall have
power to declare the punishment of treason, no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the
life of the person attainted.
This, however, while it was the chief, was not the only peculiarity of bills of attainder which was intended to be included
within the constitutional restriction. Upon an attentive examination of the distinctive features of this kind of legislation, I think
it will be found that the following comprise those essential
elements of bills of attainder, in addition to the one already
"mentioned, which distinguish them from other legislation, and
which made them so obnoxious to the statesmen who organized
our government:
1. They were convictions and sentences pronounced by the
legislative department of the government, instead of the judicial.
2. The sentence pronounced and the punishment inflicted were
determined by no previous law or fixed rule.
3. The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any such
were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his
presence, or that of his counsel, and no recognised rule of evidence governed the inquiry. (See Story on the Constitution,

§ 1844.)
It is no cause for wonder that men who had just passed successfully through a desperate struggle in behalf of civil liberty, should
feel a detestation for legislation of which these were the prominent
features. The framers of our political system had a full apprecia-
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tion of the necessity of keeping separate and distinct the primary
departments of the government. Mr. Hamilton, in the seventyeighth number of the Federalist, says that he agrees with the
maxim of Montesquieu, that "there is no liberty if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." And others of the ablest numbers of that publication
are devoted to the purpose of showing that in our constitution
these powers are so justly balanced and restrained that neither
will probably be able to make much encroachment upon the
others. Nor was it less repugnant to their views of the security
of personal rights, that any person should be condemned without
a hearing, and punished without a law previously prescribing the
nature and extent of that punishment. They therefore struck
boldly at all this machinery of legislative despotism, by for1idding
the passage of bills of attainder and ez post facto laws, both to
Congress and to the states.
It rem.ains to inquire whether, in the Act of Congress under consideration (and the remarks apply with equal force to the Missouri
constitution), there is found any one of these features of bills of
attainder, and if so, whether there is sufficient in the act to bring
it fairly within the description of that class of bills.
It is not claimed that the law works a corruption of blood. It
will therefore be conceded at once, that the act does not contain
this leiding feature of bills of attainder.
Nor am .J capable of seeing that it contains a conviction or
sentence, of any designated person or persons. It is said that it
is not necessary to a bill of attainder that the .party to be affected
should be named in the act, and the attainder of the Earl of Kildare and his associates is referred to as showing that the act was
.aimed at a class. It is very true that bills of attainder have been
passed against persons by some description, when their names
were unknown. But in such cases the law leaves nothing to be
done to render its operation effectual, but to identify those persons. Their guilt, its nature, and its punishment .are fixed by
the statute, and only their personal identity remains to be made
out. Such was the case alluded to. The act declared the-guilt
and punishment of the Earl of Kildare, and all who were associated with him in his enterprise, and all that was required to
insure their punishment was to prove that association.
If this were not so, then the act was mere brutumfulmen, and
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the parties other than the earl could only be punished, notwithstanding the act, by proof of their guilt before some competent
tribunal.
No person is pointed out in the Act of Congress, either by
name or by description, against whom it is to operate. The oath
is only required of those who propose to accept an office or to
practise law; and as a prerequisite to the exercise of the functions
of the lawyer, or the officer, it is demanded of all persons alike.
It is said to be directed as a class to those alone who were
engaged in the rebellion; but this is manifestly incorrect, as the
oath is exacted alike from the loyal and disloyal, under the same
circumstances, and none are compelled to take it. Neither does
the act declare any conviction, either of persons or- classes. If
so, who are they, and of what crime are they-declared to be
guilty? Nor does it pronounce any sentence or inflict any
punishment. If by any possibility it can be said to provide for
conviction and sentence, though not found in the act itself, it
leaves the party himself to determine his own guilt or innocence,
and pronounce his own sentence. It is not, then, the Act of Congress, but the party interested, that tries and condemns. We
shall see, when we come to the discussion of this act in its relation to ex post facto laws, that it inflicts no punishment.
A statute, then, which designates no criminal, either by name
or description-which declares no guilt, pronounces no sentence,
and inflicts no punishment-can in no sense be called a bill of
attainder.
2. Passing now to consider whether the statute is an ez post
facto law, we find that the meaning of that term as used in the
constitution is a matter which has been frequently before this
court, and it has been so well defined as to leave no room for controversy. The only doubt which can arise is as to the character
of the particular case claimed to cofne within the definition, and
not as to the definition of the phrase itself.
All the cases agpee that the term is to be applied to criminal
causes alone, and not to civil proceedings. In the language of
Justice STORY, in the case of Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters 88,
"ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal proceedings,
which impose punishment and iltiture, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private rights retrospectively :" (7alder v.
B2d?, 3 Dallas 386; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87; Oyden v.
Voz. XV.-26
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,Saunders, 12 Wheat. 266; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters
880.
The first case on the subject is that of Calder v. Bull, and it
is the one in which the doctrine concerning ez post facto laws is
most fully expounded. The court divides all laws which come
within the meaning of that clause of the constitution into four
classes:1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was when committed.
3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed.
4th. .Every law that alters the rule of evidence, and receives
less or different testimony than -the law required at the time of the
.commission of the offepice to convict the qffeuder.
Again, the court says, in the sam.e opiioi, that "t he true distipn is between ex post facto laws, apd retrospective laws," and
proceeds to show that, however unjust the latter may be, they Ar.
not prohibited by the constitution, while the former are.
This exposition of the iature of ex ppot facto laws h never
been denied, nor has any court or any commentator on the consitution added to the classes of law her set fortl, as coming
within that clause of the organic law. In looking carefully at
these four classes of laws, two things strj the mind aspgo on
to them all1st, That they contemplate the t41 of song pers.n .haged
'with an'offence,
2d. That they eplitqiplate a pupihe.n of the perso9 4und
guilty of such Qffencp,
Now, it seems to me impossibly to shoW thAt. the law in question
contemplates either the trial of s.person fQr gn offtn'ee committed
before its passage, or the punishment of any person for such an
offence. It is true that the act requirip.g an oath provides a ponalty for falsely taking it. Bit this provision is prospective, as no
one is supposed to take the oath uutil after the passage of the
law. This prospective penalty is the only thing in the law which
partakes of a criminal character. It is in all other respects a
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civil proceeding. It is simply an oath of office, and it is required
of all office-holders alike. As far as I am informed, this is the
first time in the history of jurisprudence that taking an oath of
office has been called a criminal proceeding. If it is not a criminal proceeding, then, by all the authorities, it is not an ex post
facto law.

No triaZ of any person is contemplated by the act for any past
offence. Nor is any party supposed to be charged with any
provides.
offence in the only proceeding which the law
A person proposing to appear in the court as an attorney is
asked to take a certain oath. There is no charge made against
him that he has been guilty of any of the crimes mentioned in
that oath. There is no prosecution. There is not even an implication of guilt by reason of tendering him the. oath, for it is
required of the man who has lost everything in defence of the
government, and whose loyalty is written in the honorable scars
which cover his body, the same as of the guiltiest traitor in the
land. His refusal to take the oath subjects him to no prosecution.
His taking it clears him of no -guilt, and acquits him of no
charge.
Where, then, is this ex post facto law, which tries and punishes
a man for a crime committed before it was passed ? It can only
be found in those elastic rules of construction which cramp the
.powers of the Federal Government when they are to be exercised
in certain directions, and enlarge them when they are to be exercised in others. No more striking example of this could be given
than the cases before us, in one of which the Constitution of the
United States is held to confer no power on Congress to prevent
traitors practising in her courts, while in the other it is held to
confer power.on this court to nullify a provision of the constitution of the state of Missouri, relating to a qualification required
of ministers of religion.
But the fatal vice in the reasoning of the majority is in the
meaning which they attach to the word punishment, in its application to this law, and in its relation to the definitions which have
been given of the phrase ex postfacto laws.
Webster's second definition of the word punish is this: "In a
loose sense, to afflict with punishment, &c., with a view to imendment; to chasten." And it is in this loose sense that the word
is used by this court, as synonymous with chastisement, correction,
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loss, or suffering io the party supposed to be punished, and not in
the legal sense, which signifies a penalty inflicted for the commission of a crime.
And so, in this sense, it is said that whereas persons who had
been guilty of the 'offences mentioned in the oath were, by the
laws then in force, only liable to be punished with death and confiscation of all their property, they are by a law passed since
these offences were committed, made liable to the enormous
additional punishment of being deprived of the right to practise
law.
The law in question does not in reality deprive a person guilty
of the acts therein described of any right which he possessed before;
for it is equally sound law, as it is the dictate of good sense, that
a person who, in- the language of the act, has "voluntarily borne
arms against the government of the United States while a citizen
thereof, or who has voluntarily given aid, comfort, counsel, or
encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility to the
government, has, by doing those things, forfeited his right to
appear in her courts and take part in the administration of her
laws. Such a person has exhibited a' trait ot character which,
without the aid of the law in question, authorizes the court to
declare him unfit to practise -before it, and to stfike his name from
the roll of its attorneys if it be found there.
I have already shown that this act provides for no indictment
or other charge, that it contemplates and admits of no trial, and
I now proceed to show that even-if the right of the court to prevent an attorney, guilty of the acts mentioned, from appearing in
its forum, depended upon the statute, that still it inflicts no punishmnent in the legal sense of that term.
Punis'hment, says Mr. Wharton in his Law Lexicon, is "the
penalty for transgressing the laws;" and this is, perhaps, as comprehensive and at the same time as accurate a 'definition as can
be given. Now what law is it whose transgression is punished in
the case before us? None is referred to in the act, and there is
nothing on its face to show that it was intended as an additional
punishment for any offence described in any other act. A partof the matters of which the applicant is required to purge himself on oath-may amount to treason , but surely there could be no
intention or desire to inflict this small additional punishment for

-

EX PARTE GARLAND.

a crime whose penalty already was death and confiscation of
property.
In fact the word punishment is used by the court in a sense
which would make a great number of laws, partaking in no sense
of a criminal character, laws for punishment, and therefore ea'
Vost facto.
A law, for instance, which increased the facility for detecting
frauds by compelling a party to a civil proceeding to disclose his
transactions under oath would result in his punishment in this
sense, if it compelled him to pay an honest debt which could not
be coerced from him before. But this law comes clearly within
the class described by this court in Watson v. Mercer, as civil
proceedings which affect private rights retrospectively.
Again, let us suppose that several persons afflicted with a form
of insanity heretofore deemed harmless, shall be tound all at once
to be dangerous to the lives of persons with whom they associate.
The state, therefore, passes a law that all persons so affected shall
be. kept in close confinement until their recovery is assured.
Here is a case of punishment in the sense used by the court for a
matter ekisting before the passage of the law. Is it an ez post
facto law? And if not; in what does it differ from one ? Just
in the same .manner that the Act of Congress does, namely, that
the proceeding is civil and not criminal, and that the imprisonment
in the one case and the prohibition to practise law in the other,
are not punishments in the legal meaning of that term.
The civil law maxim, "Nemo debet bis Vexari pro uno et eadam
causa," has been long since adopted into the common law as
applicable both to civil and criminal proceedings, and one of the
amendments of the Constitution incorporates this principle into
that instrument so far as punishment affects life or limb. It
results from this rule, that no man can be twice lawfully punished
for the same offence. We have already seen that the acts of
which the party is required to purge himself on *oath constitute
the crime of treason. Now if the judgment of the court in the
cases before us, instead of permitting the parties to appear without taking the oath, had been the other way, here would have
been the case of a person who, on the reasoning of the majority,
is punished by the judgment of this court for the same acts which
constitute the crime of treason.
Yet if the applicant here, should afterwards be indicted for
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treason on account of these same acts, no one will pretend that
the proceedings here could be successfully pleaded in bar of that
indictment. But why not? Simply because there is here neither
trial or punishment within the legal meaning of these terms.
I maintain that the purpose of the Act of Congress was to
require loyalty as a qualification of all who practise law in the
national courts. The majority say that the purpose was to impose
a punishment for past acts of disloyalty.
In pressing this argument it is asserted by the majority that
no requirement can be justly said to be a qualification which is
not attainable by all, and that to demand a qualification not
attainable by all is a punishment.
The Constitution of the United States provides as a qualification for the offices of President and Vice-President, that the
person elected must be a native-born citizen. Is this a punishment to all those naturalized citizens who can never attain that
qualification ? The constitutions of nearly all the states require
as a qualification for voting that the voter shall be a white male
citizen. Is this is a punishment for all the blacks who can never
become white?
Again, it was a qualification required by some of the state constitutions for the office of judge, that the person -should not be
over sixty years of age. To a very large number of the ablest
lawyers in any state this is a qualification to which they can
never attain, for every year removes them farther away from the
designated age. Is it a punishment ?
The distinguished commentator on American law, and chancellor
of the state of New York, was deprived of that office by this provision of the constitution of that state, and he was thus, in the
-midst of his usefulness, not only turned out of office, but he was
for ever disqualified from holding it again by a law passed after
he had accepted the office.

This is a much stronger case than that of a disloyal attorney
forbidden by law to practise in the courts, yet no one-ever thought
the law was ez post facto in the sense of the Constitution of the
,
United States.
Illustrations of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely, but
they are unnecessary.
The history of the time when this statute was passed-the
darkest hour of our great struggle-the necessity for its exist-

EX PARTE GARLAND.

ence, the humane character of the President who signed the bill,
and the face of the law itself, all show that it was purely a qualification, exacted in self-defence, of all who took part in administering the government in any of its departments, and that it was
not passed for the purpose of inflicting punishment, however
merited, for past offences.
I think I have now shown that the statute in question is within
the legislative power of Congress in its control over the courts
and their officers, and that it was not void as being either a bill
of attainder or an ex post facto law.
. If .I am right on the questions of qualification and punishment,
that discussion disposes also of the proposition, that the pardon
of the President relieves the party accepting it of the necessity
of taking the oath, even if the law be valid.
I am willing to concede that the presidential pardon relieves
the party from all the penalties, or in other words from all the
punishment, which the law inflicted for his offence. But it re
lieves him from nothing more. If the oath required as a condition to practising law is not a punishment, as I think I have
shown it is not, then the pardon of the President has no effect in
releasing him from the requirement to take it. If it is a qualification which Congress had a right to prescribe as necessary to
an attorney, then the President cannot, by pardon or otherwise,
dispense with the law requiring such qualification.
This is not only the plain rule as between the legislative and
executive departments of the government, but it is the "declaration
of common sense. The man who, by counterfeiting, by theft, by
murder, or by treason, is rendered unfit to exercise the functions
of an attorney or counsellor at law, may be saved by the executive pardon from the penitentiary or the gallows, but is not
thereby restored to the qualifications which are essential to
admission to the bar. No doubt it mill be found that very many
persons among those who cannot take this oath, deserve to be
relieved from the prohibition of the law; but this in no wise
depends upon the act of the President in.giving or refusing' a
pardon. It remains to the legislative power alone to prescribe
under what circumstances this relief shall be extended.
In regard to the case of Cutmmings v. The State of Missouri,
allusions have been made in the course of argument to the sanctity

-
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of the ministeriai office, and to the inviolability of religious freedom in this country.
But no, attempt has been made to show that the Constitution
of the United States interposes any such protection between the
state governments and their own citizens. Nor can anything of
this kind be shown. The Federal Constitution contains but two
provisions on this subject. One of these forbids Congress to
make any law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The other is, that no religious
test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public
trust under the United States.
No restraint is placed by that instrument on the action of the
states; but on the contrary, in the language of Story (Commentaries on the Constitution, § 1878), "the whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the state governments, to
be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the
state constitutions."
If there ever was a case calling upon this court to exercise all
the power on this subject which properly belongs to it, it was the
case of the Rev. B. Permoli, reported in 3 Howard 589.
An ordinance of the first municipality of the city of New
Orleans imposed a penalty on any priest who should officiate at
any funeral, in any other church than the obituary chapel. Mr.
Permoli, a Catholic priest, performed the funeral services of his
church over the body of oine of his parishioners, inclosed in a
coffin, in the Roman Catholic church of St. Augustine. For this
he was fined, and relying upon the vague idea advanced .here,
that the Federal Constitution protected him in the exercise of his
holy functions, he brought the case to this court.
But hard as that case was, the court replied to him in the following language: "The constitution (of the United States) makes
no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in
their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and
laws; nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of
the- United States in this respect on the states." Mr. Permoli's
writ of error was, therefore, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.'
In that case an ordinance of a mere local corporation forbade a
priest, loyal to his government, from performing what he believed
to be the necessary rites of his church over the body of hia
departed friend. This court said it could give him no relief.
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In this case the constitution of the state of Missouri, the fundamental law of the people of that state, adopted by their popular
vote, declares that no priest of any church shall exercise his
ministerial functions, unless he will show, by his own oath, that
he has borne a true allegiance to his government. This court
now holds this constitutional provision void, on the ground that
the Federal Constitution forbids it. I leave the two cases to
speak for themselves.
In the discussion of these cases I have said nothing, on the one
hand, of the great evils inflicted on the country by the voluntary
action of many of those persons affected by the laws under consideration: nor on the other hand, of the hardships which they
are now suffering, much more as a consequence of, that action
than of any laws which Congress can possibly. frame. But I
have endeavored to bring to the examination of the grave questions of constitutional law involved in this inquiry those principles
alone which are calculated to assist in determining what the law
is, rathet than what, in my private judgment, it ought to be.
I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice, and Justices
Swiiyx and DAvIs, concur in this opinion.
In the March No. of the REGISTER,
ante, p. 284, we published the opinion
of the majority of the Supreme (ourt,
delivered by M1r. Justice FE=mD in the
case of Ex PARTE GAnwP.
In the brief note which accompanied
it, we stated the substance of the majority
opinion in the Case of CUMNGS v. Tm
STATE or Missouni, to be that the oath
established by the Constitution of ]MIssouri, was not merely a test of qualifications for certain offices or professions,
but was in its nature essentially punitive,
and, therefore, contrary to the provision
of the Constitution of the United States,
which declares that no state shall pass a
bill of attainder or ex postfacto law.
The readers of the REGISTER have
thus been advised not only of the views
held by the majority, but of the arguments by which these views are supported.
Four of the nine judges, including the
Chief Justice, dissented, and the dissent-

ing opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice
M LmnR, which we herewith publish.
Upon a question on which the highest
judicial authorities in the land are so
evenly divided, it must be expeeted that
every lawyer will feel himself free to
form his own opinion, and in compliance, therefore, with the wishes of many
of our readers, we- have procured an
official copy of the opinion of Justice
MILLER, as the ablest as well as the
most authoritative presentation of the
arguments in favor of the validity of the
Act f Congress; so that the profession
may hear both sides and make up an
opinion, as nearly as may be, on grounds
of pure reason. The great questions of
constitutional law which are discussed,
and the absorbing public and professional
interest which attaches to the principles
involved, justify the extended space
given to this subject.
The decision of the same or similar
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points, however, has rbeently been forced
upon other courts, and it is proper to
take notice briefly of the results of independent investigation, by able judges,
of the general powers of the legislative
and judicial departments of government
over the privileges of attorneys as a
class.
I. In Ex PAuTE LAW, before the
District Court of the United States for
the District of Georgia, the facts were as
follows :-William Law was admitted
as an attorney to the bar of the Circuit
and District Courts of the United States
in 1817 ; he had since the close of the
war rceived a grant of pardon and amnesty from the President under the proclamation of May 29th 1865, and had
taken the oath of amnesty. Upon these
facts he applied for leave to appear and
plea& as an attorney in this court without taking the oath prescribed' by the
Act of Congress of January 24th 1865.
The application was made and the motion
argued and decided at the May Term
1866, but the decision withheld for a
time out of respect to the Supreme Court
of the United. States, where the same
question was then pending.
The court (EnsxixE, J.) was of opinion--,
1. That attorneys are not strictly
p.ic otfcers at common law, nor have
they been considered such by Congress.
The court referred especiallyto the clause
in the Constitution of the United States
(Art. I. § 7) that "no person holding
any office under the United States shall
be a member of either house during his
continuance in office," and to various
Acts of Congress in this connection.
2. That the admission of am attorney
,isa judicial act.
3. That an attorney has not technicaly a propertiin hisprofession.
4. That the Act of Congress prescribing the test oath is a penal act, and
therefore, as applied to the case of an
attorney already once admitted to the

bar, it is ex post facto, and therefore
unconstitutional.
II. In Ex PARTE HUNTERn Et AL.
and BOGGSS ET AL., at the January:

Term 1867, the subject came before the
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
By the Act of the Legislature. of West
Virginia, passed Febrnary 14th 1866,
no attorney shall be allowed to practise
in any court of that state until he shall
take an oath that he has not since the
20th of June 1863 (the date of admission
of the state into the Union) borne arms
against the state or the United $tates,
nor voluntarily given aid or 'omfort to
persons engaged in armed ihostility
thereto, by counselling or encotraging
them in the same; that, ha.has not
sought or aecepted or attempteeto exercise any office under any governxiidt in
hostility to the United Sfat&' -or thestate of West Virginia, and thathe has
not yielded a voluntary support:t any
pretended government within the United
States, hostile thereto.
The petitioners now moved to be allowed to practise without taking this
oath. Hunter and the others,.. exceptBoggess, were regularly licensed attorneys of the state of Virginia at the time
of the breaking out of the rebellion, and
were resident then and now in the territory embraced by the state of West Virginia. They took part in the rebellion
until the surrender of General Lee, and
have since been pardoned by the President, but had never- been admitted as
attorneys' to the courts of West Virginia.
Mlr. Boggess, however, had taken no
part in the rebellion and was an attorney
of this court already in practice, and declared his ability to take the oath, but
objected for other reasons.
The court, by BRowN and L6OOMSn
JJ., delivered elaborate opinions, considering the whole subject and showing1. The peculiar position of West Virginia, as engaged not only in assisting
the United States to preserve the Union,
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bnt waging a war of self-defence on her
The court then considered the general
own account against her Confederate authority of the legislature and the court
invaders.
over the admission of attorneys, and
2. That the act in question was passed were of opiion that the act in question
as a war measure.
was constit ional.
3. That by the laws of war the belliIn respect to the other class of petigerent government had a right to declare tioners, BoGGEss ET AL., the court,
the property of its enemies forfeited, and after a full consideration of the subject,
that even conceding the privilege of an were of opinion that the act in question
attorney to be property, the state had a was not in any legal sense an ex post
right under the circumstances to declare facto law or bill of attainder, and that
it forfeited, and the pardon of the Presi- the admission of an attorney was not
dent of the United States, whatever its such a contract between him and the
effect upon the privileges of the petition- state as comes within the constitutional
ers as citizens of the United States, did prohibition to the states from impairing
not restore any privileges originally de- the obligation of contracts.
derived from, and subsequently taken
J. T. M.
away, by the government of a state.

Supreme Court of Vrermont.
WILLIAM H. CARTER v. W. H. M. HOWARD.
Where a physician renders professional services- to a married woman at her
request and expressly upon her credit, while she is living apart from her husband,
he cannot afterwards recover in assumpsit against the husband.

was an action of assumpsit to recover pay for services as
a physician rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant's wife.
The case had been referred by rule of court, and was now before
the court upon the facts found and reported by the referee.
THIS

Ormsby, -Dickey & Worthen, for the plaintiff, cited 1 Pars.

Contr. 288-291; Bead v. Legard, 4 L. & Eq. 523; 2 Kent
Com. 148; -Day v. Burnham, 36 Vt. 37; Black v. Bryan, 18
Texas 453.
.febard

F.arnham, for the defendant, cited 20 Eng. L. & Eq.

345, and cases cited in note; Sawyer v. Cutting, 23 Vt. 486;
Patterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East 62; Addison v. Same, 4

Taunt. 574; 32 Ala. 227; 18 Conn. 417; Dunlap's Paley's
Agency 247-9, in notis.
The opinion of the court was delivered by

CARTER v. HOWARD.
BARRETT, J.-During the period in which most of the services
were rendered, the defendant was confined in jail on a criminal
charge. The services were rendered by the procurement of his
wife, and on her credit. She had some property in her own
right. After her husband was confined in jail she filed he
petition for a divorce, and by injunction caused her husband to
be restrained from meddling with or disposing of any of the
property held in her right. She died of the sickness for which
the plaintiff was doctoring her, and while said p~tition for divorce
and said injunction were pending; The defendant was released
from jail before his wife diedl but did hot return to live with her,
nor in.any way participate in the employment of the plaintiff as
the physician of his wife. The separation between them was
expected by both, and was designed by her, to be perpetual, and
it proved to be so. The plaintiff made his charges to the wife;
he presented his accomit as a claim against her estate; he so
made his charges, in'the language of the referee, " for the reason
that he thought he should be more likely to get his pay from her
than from the defendant." These facts distinguish the case very
widely from that of Day et.al, v. Burnham, 36 Yt. 37. The
decisive point is, whether the mere fact that the services come
under the head of necessaries, and are such as the husband would
be liable to pay for if rendered on Ihis credit, countervails *the
.legal effect of the other fact, viz. that the services were not rendered on his credit, but were rendered on the credit of the wife.
'This is not a case of any ignorance or doubt in the mind of the
plaintiff as to the character and relations of the person-Mrs.
Howard-by whom he was employed'and to whom he gave the
credit. With full knowledge of all the facts connected with or
bearing on the subject, he chose his debtor, and, upon common
principles, sustained and illustrated by abundant authority, we
think he cannot repudiate that choice and choose again. Howard's legal duty, as husband, to pay for doctoring his wife, in
case the doctoring had been done upon the credit of that duty,
would not preclude the plaintiff from ignoring such credit and
performing the services on the credit of some other person. If
the credit is so given, and nothing is subsequently done to authorize a transfer of it to some other person, the plaintiff must stand,
upon the transaction as it originally occurred; and this, too,
irrespective of the relation existing between the person to whom
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he in fact gave the credit and the one to whom he might have
given it, but did not. Many cases might be cited on this point.
See Patterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East 62; Dunl. Pal. Ag.
247-9, and cases cited in notes ; Sawyer v. Cutting et al., 23
Vt. 486; 1 Pars. Contr. 288, and cases cited.
These views and authorities do not conflict with the case of
Black v. Bryan, 18 Texas 453.
The judgment of the county court for the defendant is affirmed.
The authorities, we think, would have
justified the plaintiff in this case, perhaps, in performing the service upon the
credit of the husband, since, although
the separation was probably voluntary
on the part of the wife, it was in no
sense an adulterous elopement, or a
separation which either reason or policy
ought to condemn, since the husband
had no proper home from which the
wife had voluntarily absented herself.
But the ground upon which the case is
placed seems to preclude any recovery

of the husband, as the services were not
rendered upon the credit of the husband.
It is most unquestionable if the husband
wrongfully deserts his wife and children,
making no provision for them, he is answerable for necessaries furnished them
upon his credit: Walker v. Leighton, 11
Foster 111 ; Evans v. isher, 5 Gill 569;
lNorton v. Fazan, 1 B. &P. 226 ; Kimball
v.Keyes, 11 Wend. 33. See also as to
the general question, Chitty on Cont.
pp. 181-194, and cases cited.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of New York.
ELIZABETH MACKAY, ADMINISTRATRIX, RESPONDENT, v. THE
NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.
Where the defendant (a railroad company) has, by its own act, obstructed the
view of travellers upon, the public highway by piling itswood so that the approach
of the train to the crossing cannot be seen until the traveller is upon the track, one
who fias driven upon the track with due care, and looked' for the train as soon as
looking could be of service, will not be deemed guilty of negligence in not first
stopping hi.s team to ascertain if a train might be approachling.
If in such case the traveller is killed or injured by a collision with the cars upon
such crossing, the company will be deemed guilty of negligence, and held answerable therefor.

ACTION for damages for alleged negligent, killing of the plaintiff's intestate by defendant, in December 1864.
It appeared on the trial of the cause that, at the time mentioned, deceased was crossing defendant's track on a public highway in the town of Savannah,. with his team and sleigh, from
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south to north, and an express train of defendant's coming from
the west came in contact with and killed him.
There were obstructions on the west side of the highway of high'
ground, a building, and high piles of wood extending on both
sides, so near to the track that the train could not be seen b
deceased until his horses were on the track. Ais view to the west
was entirely shut off until then.
When on or in the middle of the track, a- train could be seen
for some sixty rods west, but no further. At that point the road
turned off and was obscured by high ground.
The weight of the evidence proved that a whistle had been
sounded, if at all, at some distance west of the s'ty rods, and
not again sounded until just at the instant before contact with
deceased, and then sounded for brakes.
There was a good deal of evidence by the plaintiff, from several
persons in a condition to hear and to know, that the bell was not
rung at all until after the injury occurred. Two of the employees
of the company testified to ringing it, and one of the plaintiff's
witnesses swore that it first rung, as he heard, about twenty rods
before coming to the deceased. The public highway at this place
was ordinarily four rods wide, but it was so filled in with wood on
each side, piled there near defendant's depot, that it was only
about eighteen or twenty feet, or a little over one rod wide at the.
time of the accident.
No flagman was stationed at this crossing, and defendant's
track crossed on the same surface over the highway. Defendant's
engineer of that train testified that he "did not observe, the team
at. all on the track. until just at the time of the collision." The
fireman said the same. He thought they got "closer than a rod
or two" befor6 he saw the team. He said the snow flew so that
he could not see very well.
There was evidence sufficient to apthorize a jury to find that
the wood so piled in the road belonged to the defendant, and
-was put there for defendant's use and by its authority. There
was a. steam sawing-machine directly on the north side of the
track in operation there that day. "It made considerable noise,"
and the witness thought deceased 'could hear it.
It was proved by Remer, a witness called by defendant, that
deceased could not see the track to the west until his horses got
on the track; that when his horses did get on the track, he saw
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deceased turn his head as though looking west. At that po.int he
"instantly" began to draw back his horses. The horses were
frightened, sprang forward and escaped, and intestate was crushed
and killed.
The witness, standing off some distance, spoke to deceased that
the cars were coming, but it is quite clear that deceased did not
understand him. He looked partly around, but not at the witness.
Very probably he heard a voice, but not so as to understand any
words. A witness standing still, half a rod further off, did not
hear it. Deceased was slightly deaf, but could hear ordinary
conversation when his attention was given to it.
The defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit, on two grounds:1. There was no negligence of defendant.
2. There was negligence of deceased.
The motion was denied, and under the charge of the court the
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The judgment having
been affirmed at General Term, the defendant appealed to this
court.
Geo. F. -Danforth,for the plaintiff.
James B. Cox, for the defendant.
PECKHAM, J.-Two points were raised by the defence on the
motion for a nonsuit-only one of them is insisted upon here. It
is not here urged that the defendant was not negligent. It is
quite clear that there was evidence enough to go to the jury as to
the proper and timely ringing of the bell-as well as in regard to
the continuous blowing of the whistle, as required by the statute.
There was a good deal of evidence of negligent omission as to
both. There was also evidence that the defendant had deprived
the public in a large degree of the power of protecting itself from
danger by these piles of wood and by its building, which prevented any one from seeing the danger until it might be too late.
But, as the point of defendant's freedom from negligence is not
now urged, there is no occasion for its discussion.
Then, was the deceased guilty of negligence contributing to his
death ?
This train was running from thirty to thirty-five miles the hour.
At thirty-five miles, it ran over three rods in a second. He drove
slowly and carefully up to the point where he could first see ofi
the track to the west, and then he looked and "instantly" did all
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he could to hold back his horses-all in vain. It should be
remembered that he looked the first instant that looking could be
of any benefit. We may safely say that he heard no whistle or
-bell. Seven witnesses, at least, within three rods of him, and
some much nearer, were in like condition, hearing neither bell noi
whistle, viz.: Mrs. Hooper, David Harrington, Isaac Cook, Sherman, Terry, Harriet Cook, and James Harrington. It is stated
in defendant's brief, that the last witness heard the bell. On
looking over his testimony, it is not found there. He heard the
whistle to brake just before deceased was struck-not the bell at
all. There was a high wind, considerable noise fr-om the steam
sawing-machine, the snow was blowing, and it was, no doubt,
difficult to hear the cars in that narrow defile. It may safely be
said that deceased did not hear the cars, nor any indication of
their approach. Any twelve fair-minded men would so find the
fact, under the evidence in this case. There is no evidence that
he intended to commit suicide. The counsel for the defence does
not intimate that deceased had any such intent. He was an
industrious, sober man, and intended to be careful. He risked
his life on his care here, and erroneously deemad it safe.
It was urged by the defendant's counsel that deceased was
guilty of negligence-that he ought to have been careful to look
and listen, &c.; but he failed to show in what respect deceased
was careless. All authorities say he must be careful. The
deceased was so here. He drove carefully, and he looked the
first instant that looking would be of service. What .did he omit
to do ? It was well observed by the learned justice who gave the
opinion in this case at General Term, that no case had gone the
length of holding "that a person approaching a railroad-crossing
was bound to stop his team and wait till he could ascertain
whether a train was coming, or to leave his team and go and
look up and down the track, or the law 'would hold him"
negligent.
But if he had done that even-if he had tied his team and gone
and looked up and down, it would not have afforded him the least
protection. In less than twenty seconds from his looking, the
train would, or might have been, upon him. He could see but
forty rods-the" train ran that in less than twenty seconds--and
he must have used more than that time in returning to his team
and getting under way. It is said he should have left them
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untied ? If he had, and they had moved on and been run over,
the cars thrown off the track and other damage ensued, he would
have been justly chargeable with negligence.
Again, I ask, what did the deceased omit to do that made him
negligent? The omission is not, and I think it cannot, be stated.
The deceased had as clear a legal right to travel over this road
as the defendant had. He was bound to exercise the care in
doing so that people in general would exercise under like circumstances. If he exercised that care, as I think, under the circumstances, he did, and was unable to cross safely, the defendant is
liable.
The great difficulty of crossing had been caused by the defendant itself'in erecting the building and piling up the wood so as
entirely to obstruct the view. Deceased is then charged with
negligence in not seeing where defendant's own wrongful act had
put it out of his power to see. The act was wrongful, as defendant had no right thus to fill up the road with wood.
Thus far I have said nothing as to the submission of this case
to the jury. If there was any doubt as to the credibility of any
witness, as to the inference to be drawn from any fact, or as to
the evidence to prove a fact, then it was, of course, a question for
the jury. In my opinion, there was nothing in the conduct of
deceased on which to base a charge of negligence. At this point
I turn to the opinion of the learned justice who dissented at
General Term, to learn what the deceased omitted. It is there
said, "it was his duty to have looked both ways upon the track
before he attempted to cross."T
In this case it was not material for him to have looked east, as
no danger came from that direction. He did look west on the
track the instant he could do so-the instant he could see on the
track. He fully complied in spirit with the requirement of the
learned justice. If this action, under these circumstances, cannot
be maintained, then the citizens have no legal right to travel on
this public road. It is worse than idle to call that a right, which
may be violated or destroyed with impunity.
I am quite aware of the late tendency and course df judicial
decision in this state, to assume the province of jurors in cases of
negligence charged upon railroad companies, entirely at war, in
my opinion, with the well-settled doctrines of the common law. I
would not go further in that direction. No case can yet be found
VOL. XV.--27
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that would have warranted the court to nonsuit this plaintiff. For
the honor of the law, as well as' from considerations of sound
policy and the impartial administration of justice, I trust there
never will be.
Is there not some defect in the laws, or in their administration,'
when so many lives are sacrificed-so many human beings killed
annually at these crossings ? Does any public necessity or public
benefit require this destruction ?
If courts may be swayed by considerations of public policy, is
it not their duty, as it should be their inclination, to diminish this
loss of life, if their decisions can have that tendency ?
The *counsel for the defence intimated that, if this action was
sustained, others would be induced to drive recklessly. 9n the track
and endanger the lives of passengers in the cars.
Human experience furnishes no ground for such an intimation.
It is entirely idle. What a man will not do to save.his life, no
forfeiture of goods or penalties that law can inflict will make him
do. He will adopt all the precautions he deems appropriate to
protect his life. Human penalties can make him do no more.
They cannot change man's nature. Hence, rules for his government should be adapted to the actual man, as he is. You do not
expect the same care and caution from the mass of ignorant laborers that is exercised by educated, grave philosophers. The niass
of men would never exert it, and the law that requires it would
*be absurd.
He should be called upon for such care only as a man in his
situation and condition in life would ordinarily exert under like
circumstances. Does not a juror know what that is, as well as a
judge ? The ignorant and the unwary are entitled to the protection of the law, as well as the wise and the educated.
There is very little justice in depriving a man of his life for
not exercising more care than his capcity will allow him to exert.
The most cautious and thoughtful are sometimes absorbed by their
business, their cares, or their griefs ; and thus they cannot exert
their usual caution.
What is the remedy? While all proper care should be
demanded from the public, the protecting vigilance should be
required from railroads. It is all .in their power. They are
authorized to cross a public road above or below its surface.
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Why should they not do so, and thus avoid all peril to travellers
on the highway, as well as to their own passengers?
They should employ competent, vigilant men on their train,
who would watch and warn of danger, ring the bell properly and
sound the whistle, and yet watch and see at these crossings that
the track was clear. They can always effectually do so, if the
track be sufficiently free from obstructions to its view : and' it is
the duty of the railroad to see that it is free.
Let it be held, as the defence contends for in this case, that no
amount of negligence of the railroad can make it liable for killing
a man at a crossing, and the negligence will increase with entire
certainty. What matters it to them whether the bell is rung, if
no liability follows from its omission, no matter what the damage ?
Reckless indifference to their duties to the outside public, in the
employees of the road, is thus encouraged and sustained, and loss
of life the certain consequence.
They may omit to ring the bell entirely, and the railroads may,
as they did here, obstruct the view for their own accommodation,
so that the traveller, look all he may, cannot see the danger till
too late to escape ; and what protection has the public in the
exercise of its conceded right to cross a public road ?
It is urged that deceased must have known that this train was
due. There was evidence that he lived within about two and a
half miles of this depot; that the time-table had been altered
within a month; and he had been drawing wood to the depot only
for one day. There is no high degree of probability that a
laboring man, like deceased, had any accurate information on
that point, unless his business necessarily required, it. If that
were a material point, certainly, under the evidence, it was a
question for the jury.
The train was not far from its regular time ; the witness thought
it a little behind, but he thought not as much as fifteen minutes.
Deceased might have supposed it had passed, if he knew its regular time for passing ; but, in all probability, he then had no certain knowledge of the actual time. Such a man would scarcely
have a watch. In my judgment, this point as to time is entitled
to very little consideration.
I think the court committed no error in its refusal to charge.
The charge substantially accorded with most of the requests, and
there was no legal propriety in calling for a repetition in other
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language; nor did it impose any obligation upon the court to
make such repetition. Where the requests differ from the charge,
I do not think the court erred in refusing to grant them.
There is no reported decision in this state, that I have seen,
not in harmony with the maintenance of this action. Principle
and public policy also sustain it.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Concurring, PORTER, WRIGHT, SmITH, and HUNT, JJ.

Court of Chancery of 2ew Jersey.
CHRISTIAN A. ZABRISKIE v. HACKENSACK AND NEW YORK
RAILROAD CO. ET AL.
It is settled law that the business for which a corporation was farmed cannot be
changed against the will of any stockholder, however large the madority may be in
its favor.
A clause in a legislative charter of incorporation that the legislature may at .any
time alter, modify, or repeal the same, does not give the legislature power to
change the purposes of the corporation. The alteration must be of something
contained in the charter, or some franchise conferred by it.
Such clause is a reservation to the state for the benefit of the public, and to be
exercised by the state only.
Therefore such clause does not enable the legislature, even with the assent of a
majority of the stockholders, to change the purposes of the corporation if opposed
by any stockholder.

Clharles H. 1T oorhis, for complainant.
M. M. Knavp and John Hopper, for defendants.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of
ZABRISKIE, 0.-The Hackensack and New York Railroad Co. was
incorporated in 1856, with power to construct a railroad from Hackensack to the Paterson and Hudson River Railroad, 'witha capital
stock of $200,000, and with power to mortgage its road and lands,
franchises, and appurtenances to the amount of $50,000. Under
this act it laid out, located, and built a road five miles in length,
terminating at Essex street, in Hackensack, within one mile of
the court-house, as required by the charter. It borrowed $30,000,
for which it gave a mortgage upon the road, and its equipment,
franchises, and other property. By a supplement to this charter
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passed March 12th 1861, it was authorized to extend the road
northwardly to Nanuet, on the Erie Railway, in the state of New
York, a distance of about twelve miles, to increase the capital
stock to any extent required, and to issue bonds to the amount of
$250,000, which, in the words of the act, were " for the construction and equipment of the road to be constructed under this
act; and to secure the payment of said bonds, the said company
shall have power to mortgage the said. road with its franchises
and chartered rights."
In 1861 the company extended its road under this supplement
to a point on Passaic street, in the village of Hackensack, more
than a mile from the court-house, the length of the extension
being about a mile. After this it executed a new mortgage upon
the whole road as extended, and its equipments aud its franchises
and chartered rights, to secure the payment of $10,000. No new
stock was issued for this extension.
The company has recently, under the supplement of 1861, laid
out and located another extenston for about a mile and a half
north of the present terminus, reaching from Hackensack to New
Bridge, and has made contracts for the construction of it; and
has by resolution determined to make a new mortgage to cover
the whole road, as it will be when finished to New Bridge, with
its equipments and appurtenances, and the chartered rights and
franchises of the company to secure one hundred bonds of $1000
each for the purpose of paying off the two mortgages which are
now on the road, for relaying with new rails and ties the road first
built, and furnishing it with the necessary equipment, which is
now deficient, for its business, and for constructing and equipping
the extension to the New Bridge.
The complainant is a stockholder in the company; and of nine
hundred and thirty shares of capital stock issued for $100 each,
he owns three hundred and twenty-four. He applies for an injunction to restrain the defendants from constructing the extension to
the New Bridge, and from executing the mortgage proposed.
He opposes the extension on the ground that it is a different
enterprise from that for which his stock was taken and the money
paid ; and that neither the directors nor a majority of the stockholders can compel him to embark his capital in any undertaking
but the one for which it was subscribed and paid.
The extension to Nanuet, authorized by the Act of 1861, has
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never been submitted formally to the stockholders, nor has it in
any way been approved of by them or a majority of them, except
by the assent given in the answer in this suit to which the directors are made defendants, which is sworn to by the directors individually, who own together five hundred and seventeen shares of the'
capital stock. But of this, two hundred shares held by one of them,
Mr. Robert Rennie, is special stock, issued to him to build the Lodi
Branch, which is leased to him during the existence of the company, and which he is to, operate at his own expense and for his
own profit, under an agreement that he shall pay as rent the dividends that may be declared on these two hundred shares, and
under another agreement, indorsed on the certificate of stock
issued for these shares, that they are to be entitled to no dividends
beyond the rent of the Lodi Branch, or, in other words, that he is
to pay no rent and this stock is to receive no dividends. Under
these circumstances this stock can receive no benefit from the
extension, if it is profitable, nor sustain any loss from it if it is
ruinous. And it would seem that if the consent of a majority of
the shareholders was necessary to the new eiterprise of the extension, that the assent of the other three hundred and seventeen
shares held by the directors not being a majority of the whole
stock, or even equal to the stock held by the complainant who dissents, is not the consent of the majority of the stockholders.
And if it is necessary to obtain the consent of a majority to make
the extension authorized by the supplement of 1861, that consent
does not appear in the cause as now presented.
The extension authorized by the Act of 1861 is i radical
change in the object of this incorporation; it is an enterprise
entirely different from that in the charter. That was to construct
and operate a railroad from Hackensack to the Paterson Railroad
at Boiling Spring, an easy and almost direct route to New York;
it was from a thriving village, the county town of Bergen county,
over a level country, and only five miles in length, as shown by
the return of its location. The extension would be about twelve
miles in length, through an uneven country mostly if not wholly
agricultural, with no village except the very small one at New
Bridge on its route, and it runs into the state of New York some
distance, and terminates at a point on that part of the Erie Railway which the company have abandoned for regular traffic, and
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It is an 'entirely different
on which few trains are run.
enterprise.
The queztion here is, can this company, either with or without
the consent of a majority in interest of its stockholders, compel
the complainant to embark capital subscribed for the first enterprise in this new one, entirely different.
Since the Dart-niouth (oll0,eye Case in the Supreme Court of the
United States, the doctrine has been considered firmly established,
and been confirmed by repeated decisions both in that court and the
state courts, that a charter granted by the legislature to a corporation, is a contract between the state and the corporators, and
that the state can pass no act to take away or impair any of the franchises or privileges granted by it. The company or artificial person thus created and its property are subject to all general laws and
police regulations made by the legislature after such grant in the
same manner as natural persons and their property are, provided
they are not such as to take away or impair any of the franchises
plainly granted by the charter. This doctrine did not prevent
the legislature from conferring new privileges upon any corporation to be accepted at its own election.
It is also settled upon the principles of the common law in
England, in this state, and most of the United States, that when
a number of persons associate themselves as partners for a business
and time specified in the agreement between them, or become
members of a corporation for definite purposes and objects, specified in their charter, which in such case is their contract, and for
a time settled by it, that the object and business of the partnership or corporation cannot be changed, or abandoned, or sold out
within the time specified, without the consent of all the partners
or corporators-one partner or corporator, however small his
interest, can prevent it. And this is so, although by law a
majority in either case can control or manage the business against
the will and interest of the minority, so long as it is within the
scope of the partnership or charter. This rule is founded on
principle, the great principle of protecting every man and his
property by contracts entered into. A guiding principle in all
right legislation, and incorporated into the constitutions of the
United States and of almost every state in the Union.
And the rule is not changed because the new business or enter-
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prise proposed is allowed by law, or has been made lawful since
the association was formed.
The leading case on this subject, is that of Natuseh v. Swing,
decided by Lord ELDON in 1824. It is not contained in the
regular reports, but may be found in the appendix to Gow ot
Partnership (3d ed.) 576, or in Lindley on Partnership, p. 511
(92 Law Lib.). There a partnership was formed for life insurrance, and after it was entered into, an Act of Parliament made
it lawful for such a firm to enter upon the business of -marine
insurance which was prohibited to them before. A majority of
the partners determined to embark in the business of marine
insurance thus made lawful. Lord ELDON held them bound.hy
the contract of copartnership, unless every partner agreed to
alter it. In England the same doctrine is applied to corporations
rigidly, and is acknowledged in all the cases on that subject.
And although, from the omnipotent power of Parliament restrained
by no written constitution, they hold that the contract can be
changed by Act of Parliament; yet the English Court of Chancery will enjoin the directors, or the corporation, on application
of a single stockholder, from using the common funds to apply to
Parliament for a change.
The doctrine of Natusch v. Swing was adopted in New York
by Chancellor KFNT, in the case of Livingston v. Lynch, 4 J- C.
R. 573, and in this state by the decision of PARKER, Master, sit,
Sting to advise the chancellor in Kean v. Johnston,I Stockt. 401,
and has been recognised and adopted in almost all the states of
thq Union. The opinion of Chancellor BENNETT in Stevens v.
The Rutland and Burlington Railroad Co., 29 Yerm. 548 (also
found in 1 Am. Law Reg. 154), contains a very able exposition
and application of it.
It will also be found in Ang. & Ames on Corp., §§ 391-93, and
§§ 536-539; Lindley on Part. 515; Pierce on Railways 78;
Hartfordand New H~aven Railroad Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 383;
Troy and Rutland Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581; Macedon Plank Road Co. v. Layham, 18 Id. 312; Buff. Corn. and
N. Y. Railroad Co. v. Pottle, 23 Id. 21; Banett v. Alt. and
Sangamon Railroad Co., 13 Ill. 504; Graham v. Birkenhead
Railroad Co., 2 McNaghton & Gor. 156.
After the effect of the rule established in the Dartmouth College Case began to be felt in the states, it was found that by the
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numerous acts of incorporation freely and perhaps necessarily
granted, great inconveniences resulted, and that provisions incautiously inserted, too much restricted the powers of future legislatures; and that the laws which experience showed were necessary to govern corporations in the exercise of their powers could
not be passed. And the legislatures of many states by degrees,
and successively, adopted the practice of inserting in acts granting franchises, that they might alter, modify, or repeal the act.
And also by general law provided that all acts of incorporation
thereafter passed should be subject to such alteration and repeal.
The provision is contained in the General Act of this state, passed
in 1846, Nix. Dig. 152, § 6; that such charters should be subject
to alteration, suspension, and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature. This and all similar special and general provisions,
were intended for the purpose specified, to give to the legislature
the clear right at their pleasure to alter or repeal the acts of
incorporation. The state without this could have done it with
the assent of the corporation. They could give them property;
they could add to their powers or privileges. But they could not
take away any power, privilege, or franchises conferred by the
act, nor compel them to exercise any new power or franchise
conferred.
Besides this general law of the state the charter of the defendant contains this provision, "that the legislature may at any time
alter, modify, or repeal the same."
The object and purpose of these provisions are so plainly
expressed in the words, that it seems strange that any doubt
could be raised concerning them. It was a reservation to the state
for the benefit of the public, to be exercised by the state only.
The state was making what had been decided to be a contract,
and it reserved the power of change, by altering, modifying, or
repealing the contract. Neither the words nor the circumstances,
nor apparent objects for which this provision was made, can by
any fair construction extend it to giving a power to one part of
the corporators as against the other which they did not have
before.
It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth College Case, not
that in Natusch v. Swing, that the change was made. The words
limit the power to that object.
On general principles and the settled rules of construction, I

ZABRISKIE v. RAILROAD CO.

would hold this to be the effect and only effect of the provision in
the general act'and in the charter of the defendants without any
hesitation, were it not for a series of decisions, by most respectable courts, which hold that .this provision obviates the effect of
the rule in Natusch v. Swing and Kean v. Johnson, and enables
a majority of the corporators in all charters subject to a like provision, to .change by legislative permission and within certain
limits the object and purpose of the corporation. They hold that
the contract between associate corporators that they will confine
their business to life insurance, is changed by legislative permission to engage in marine insurance, or a contract to join in constructing a railroad from New York to Newark, can be changed
to one from New York to Elizabeth by legislative consent. The
reasoning is founded on the fact that the subscription to the stock,
which is the contract, is made as in this case to a charter which
authorizes a road from the Paterson road to Hackensack, and
authorizes the legislature to alter and modify the act, is a contract to join in building any road that the legislature may by
such alteration authorize the company to build. And that such
authority or additional privilege may be accepted by a majority
of the corporators.
So far as the alteration is made by the legislature in a way to
be compulsory on the corporation this is correct, as if they should
.require the company to build a double track, or widen the draws
in a bridge, or exact less fare or toll; these would be within the
contract or would be annexed to it as a condition, -and every
stockholder would take his stock subject to the contingency of
such alteration. But if the change in the act is simply offering
the corporation the privilege of entering into another and a different enterprise, it is not within the condition to the subscription;
the only construction to be given is that the legislature may alter,
not that the stockholders may as between , each other. The case
of Natusch v. Swing was decided upon this very ground. The
Act of Parliament had given the company the power to embark
in marine insurance, but the conseni of all the parties was still
held necessary.
The plain object of the reservation in this case was to give the
legislature, not a bare majority of the stockholders, power.
This view of the case is so clear upon principle that I feel con.
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strained to be guided by it, although the weight of the decisions
in other states is against it.
In Maine the decisions of the Supreme Court are in accordance
with it. In the case of The Meadow -Dam Co. v. Gray, 30 Me.
547, the company was incorporated to build a dam across navigable waters, and under the power reserved, to alter and repeal,
an act was passed requiring the company to make in the dam a
lock for the benefit of public navigation. This was not increasing
the power or changing the enterprise of the corporation, but requiring in the work authorized an accommodation for the public
omitted in the original act; what the change was is not mentioned
in the report, but it is stated in Oldtown and -Lincoln Railroad
Co. v. Veasie, 39 Me. 571, by Chief Justice SHEPLEY, who delivered the opinion in both cases.
In the case of The Oldtown and Lincoln .ailroad Co. v.
Vreasie, 39 Me. 571, the act of incorporation, passed March 8th
1852, authorized not less than eight thousand or more than fifteen
thousand. shares. Veasie, August 13th 1852, subscribed for one
thousand shares; only nine thousand five hundred shares were
subscribed ; a supplementpassed September 23d 1853, under the
power reserved to alter, fixed the capital at not less than eight
thousand or more than twenty-five thousand shares. This was
accepted by the directors. Veasie was sued for his subscription, and objected on the ground that until the supplement was
passed the number of shares required to constitute the company
not having been subscribed, he could not be sued for his subscription, and that the legislature under the power reserved,
although they might alter the charter, could not affect the rights
of the stockholders between themselves, or change their contract
with the company. The court held that he was not liable under
.the original act to be sued until eight thousand shares were subscribed for, and that the power to amend did not authorize a
change in the rights or liabilities of the corporators between
themselves. Chief Justice SHEPLEY says (p. 580): "The legislature might as well have attempted to alter a contract between the
corporation and one of its members respecting the construction
of the road, as respecting a contract tq any part of its capital;
if a corporation being party to a contract with one of its corporators, might by the assistance of the legislature absolve itself
from the performance of any part of the contract, it might from
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the whole, and might require payments of the money subscribed
without allowing the subscriber to derive any benefit from it.
"It is the charter only, and the rights and liabilities of the
corporation and of the corporators as such, in consequence
thereof, that can be varied by an act of the legislature, and not
the private contracts made between the corporation as one party
and its corporators as the other."
Now in this case the private contract between the stockholders
and the corporation, or between them mutually, on subscribing
for the stock was, that their enterprise was the road from the
Paterson Railroad to Hackensack, and the power reserved was
not to. authorize any of the parties to this private contract at
their pleasure to violate it. The supplement of 1861 does not
require the extension to be built, it only authorizes it at the
option of the corporation. The words are, "it shall be lawful for
said company to extend their railroad." And it is held in England, where the courts, by mandamus, compel a company to construct the road it is incorporated to construct, that an act giving
the privilege of extension is not obligatory on the company, and
the mandamus is in such case refused: York and Midland
Railway Co. v. The Queen, 1 E. & B. 858, in which the Exchequer Chamber reversed the decision of the Common Bench in the
same case, 1 E. & B. 178.
In New York a different rule has been established, and it is
held that the power to alter will authorize the company, by consent'of the legislature, to extend its enterprise without-the c6nsent
of the stockholders; the rule was first adopted to enable companies to subscribe to the stock or bonds of other enterprises that
brought business to them, and then was extended to cases where
they were authorized to build extensions or branches to their own
works: N orthern Bailroad Co. v. Miller, 10 Barb. 260; Fhite
v. Syracuse and Utica Bailroad Co., 14 Id. 560; Sch. and Sar."
Railroad Co. v. !Thatcher, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.) 102; Buffalo.and
.New York City Railroad Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. (5 Kern.)
836.
The reasoning of the judges in these cases does not satisfy me.
The courts which decided the first cases would not have adopted
the principle which guided them, if they had been asked to apply
it to a case like this, or like the later cases in New York, in 14
Barb. 570. Judge EDWARDS, in delivering the opinion of the
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court says, that under this reservation the legislature cannot
create a new company with a new and distinct business, but that
in the case before them, the company would remain the same as
to its character, structure, objects, and business. It would have
the same road, the same buildings and property, with the same
agents as it would have if the law had not been passed. But the
principle of power to let a majority alter, is the same whether the
alteration be great or small, and courts can exercise no discretion
as to the extent of change which the company, by permission of
the legislature, may adopt.
In the case of the Sch. and Sar. Plank-Road Co. v. Hatcher,
11 N. Y. 109, the court put their decision on the ground that the
change was unimportant and would not injure the defendant, and
seem by their reasoning to admit, that if the change was as great
as in the case of Th *eHartford and New Haven Railroad Co. v.
Croswell, they would have decided differently. In: The Buffalo
and New York City Railroad Co. v. -Dudley, 14 N. Y. 355,
SELDEN, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, places the
decision on the ground that it was ruled in the case just quoted,
" that no mere addition to, or alteration of, the charter, however
great, could operate to discharge a stockholder from his obligation to the corporation." And he questions the soundness of the
decision in The Hartford and lNew Haven Railroad Co. v. Croswell. These decisions are not sufficiently consistent, or so based
upon the principles that should govern this case, as to influence
me to depart from the conclusions arrived at.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has followed the decisions
in New York, and in the well-considered and well-argued case of
.Durfee v. The Old Colony Railroad Co., 5 Allen 230, arrived
at the conclusion that the reserved right to alter and repeal
authorized a company to engage in a new enterprise without the
consent of all the stockholders. The reasoning of the able
counsel that combated this position is the best exposition of the
law that I have found.
But the reasoning of Chief Justice BIGELOW in delivering the
opinion of the court does not convince me; he places the decision
upon principles not acknowledged in this state, and relies upon
the two cases in Maine cited above, as well as those in New
York, as supporting his view. He assumes (on p. 244) that it is
the object of the provision that an amendment may be made by
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the consent of both parties-the legislature on the one side, and
the corporation.on the other, the former expressing its assent by
a legislative act, and the latter by a vote of the majority of stockholders'-and observes, " that it is nothing more than the ordinary
case of a stipulation that one of the parties to a contract may
vary its terms with the consent of the other contracting party."
Now in this state, it is settled that an alteration made by the
legislature under this reserved power is valid and binding., without the consent and against the will of the corporation and all its
members. The two decisions of the Court of Errors, not yet
reported, upon the charters of the Morris and Essex Railroad
Company and of the Jersey City and Bergen Railroad Company,
settle, 'that the legislature may against the will of the companies
change the mode of taxation prescribed in their charters for one
more burdensome. And the rule of the common: law as to contracts adopted here, gives the pqwer to the parties, where both
assent, to alter any contract without the stipulation for that purpose, which would seem from the language of the opinion to be
ordinarily inserted for it in Massachusetts. This view, that the
object of the reserved power was to give the majority of the corporators the power to control the minority, with the consent of the
legislature, has never been adopted in this state. The act of
Massachusetts, Statutes 1881, ch. 81, to which refeFence is made,
contains no provision as to consent of the stockholders, but is a
*pure simple reservation of power like the Act of New Jersey.
The decisions in the cases of Banet v. Alton and 3ang.'Railroad Co., 13 Ill. 504, The Pacific Railroad v. Rensaw, 18 Mo.
208, The Pacific Railroad Co. v. .ughes, 22 Id. 281, hbld that
the majority of the stockholders by authority of the legislature
may make a change provided it is not great or a radical one.
They in express terms say that a change like this would not be
warranted, and so far as of authority, are on the side of the complainant. But the principle on which they are decided is wrong,
and if it is once conceded that a majority of the corporators may,
by authority from the legislature, change the object of the enterprise on small things, there is no principle of law by which they
can be restrained in any a little larger, or in the character of the
whole work. The same principle will lead the courts of Illinois
and Missouri, as it did those in New York, to allow radical
changes, and must, if consistently applied, allow a charter for a
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railroad to be used for banking or insurance business, or for a
canal, theatre, brewery, or beer saloon.
There is no other alternative to the proposition, that while the
power reserved authorizes the legislature within certain limits to
make such alterations as they choose to impose, it gives no
authority, when the legislature does not impose them, for the
majority to adopt such alterations or enter upon such enterprises
as are allowed by the legislature.
Again, the power of the legislature has its limit; it can repeal
or suspend the charter; it can alter or-modify it; it can takc
away the charter-but it cannot impose a new one, and oblige thystockholders to accept it; it can alter or modify it. But powe
to alter or modify anything can never be held to imply a powei
to substitute a thing entirely different. It is not the meaning of
the words in their usually received sense: power to alter a manlion-house would never be construed to* mean a power to tear
down all but the back kitchen and front piazza, and build one
three times as large in its place ; in anything altered, something must be preserved to keep up its identity, and a matter
of the same kind wholly or chiefly new substituted for another is
not an alteration, it is a change.- In some cases there might be
room for doubt, but in this case there can be no hesitation in saying that a railroad of seventeen miles from the Paterson Road to
the Nanuet, is a change and substitution of one work for another,
and not an alteration of the road to Htackensack. They are substantially two different enterprises.
Again, the power is to alter or modify the act, and the true
construction of this I hold to be, it must be an alteration of something contained in or granted by the act-any of the franchises
granted may be altered. The right to take land by condemnation,
the right to take tolls or fare, or the amounts to be taken ; but
the legislature had no right to impose upon the company any
other duty, or anything involving any other duty than that
attending the building a railroad from the Paterson Road to
iackensack; anything in the manner of doing that they had a
right to change. They could not oblige it to dam and drain all
the meadows along the Hackensack, or to construct a canal or
build a road from Hoboken to Newark. Nor could they oblige
it to extend its road to Nanuet. They could as well oblige it to
run to the Pacific. We must keep in mind, that by the decisions

ZABRISKIE v. RAILROAD CO.

in New Jersey the company need not accept the alterations; they
are bound by them.
By a wider construction of this power, any of the main lines
of railroad running through the state incorporated since 1846, or
by an act which has in it the power of alteration; may be cornpelled to build and run a branch to any village or place near, that
route that the legislature may direct. It must be held that the
power to alter and modify does not give power to make any substantial additions to the work.
Again, the Act of 1861 does not in fact alter or modify the
Act of 1856 in any one thing contained in it. That act, and every
power and franchise granted by it, and every duty it imposed,
remain~s the same, and the defendants can now go on under it precisely as if the supplement had not been passed. The company
is authorized to construct another road-it is not compelled to do
it. If it builds it, or if it does iot, its old charter remains with
all its franchises and privileges intact, and no new burdens imposed, except so far as it assumes them. This is in no sense of
the word an alteration of the charter. It would be as absurd to
say that an owner had altered his house, who had built a larger
one on an adjoining lot; and until the legislature has made a
valid alteration of the charter, the rights of each stockholder are
as held in Kean v. Johnstoni-he can prevent all the others from
changing or abandoning the work.
The supplement of 1861 is a properly valid and constitutional
act; it is a grant and privilege that the legislature h.ave a -right
to grant-as they could grant to this corporation the right to
conduct banking or insurance business or run a ferry across the
North River; but the company is restrained by the law of corporations and partnership, from expending the money or using
the credit of the corporation in such enterprises unless every
shareholder consents.
The extension to Passaic street, b'oth because it comes within
the grant in the charter, and more especially because every shareholder must be held to have consented to it by acquiescing in its
construction and maintenance for years, must be decided to be
lawful.
The defendants must be restrained from extending the road
beyond its present terminus at Passaic street, and from expending
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any money of the company to pay for any such extension, or from
giving any mortgage for the cost of such extension.
There is no foundation for an injunction against a mortgage for
any lawful object of either part of the road. There is great
doubt whether a mortgage on either of the two parts of the road
heretofore constructed for the cost of the other, would pass the
franchises of the company in such mortgaged part; but it would
be valid as to the property other than franchises, which the company can mortgage without any special power. And besides the
bonds of the company, or its lawful contracts would entitle the
holder to recover, and under the judgment the whole road and
franchises could be sold. The complainant, therefore, cannot be
injured by the mortgage, whether valid or not, as to any part of
the road.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
MUSGRAVE v. BENKENDORF.
The measure of damages for conversion of shares of stock loaned, where the
value has risen since the conversion, is the value at the time of trial.

ERROR to Common Pleas of Allegheny county.
The opinion of the court was delivered hy
J.-The question in this case is, what is the measure
of damages on a loan of fourteen bonds of $1000, twelve of which
were State of Missouri sixes, and two Hannibal and St. Joseph
Railroad bonds, upon an agreement to return the identical bonds
in two years, with interest? Baron PARKE, a great authority,
in Shaw v. Holland, 15 M. & W. 145, says, "With respect to
the amount of damages, I was at first disposed to think that this
was like the case of an action for not replacing stock, in which
the measure of damages is the difference of price on the day it
was to have been replaced and on the day of trial."
In Owen v. Iouth, 14 -0. B. 327 (78 E. C. L. R.), it was
held, that the true measure of damages in an action for not redelivering shares lent to the defendant, upon a contract to return
them upon a given day, is not the market price at the time of the
breach, but the market price at the time of the trial. The previous authorities were cited, and Lush said, " All the authorities,
READ,
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it must be conceded, are in favor of the plaintiff's view as to
the last point. It would be vain to attempt to induce the court
to come to a different conclusion, assuming that the measure is to
be, not the highest price at any intermediate day, but the price
on the day of the trial." Chief Justice JERVIS said, "Mr. Lush
has very properly conceded that he is bound by the authorities
upon the question as to the proper measure of damages in this
case, which are .to be estimated at the market price of the shares
at the time of the trial."
In VFaug)an v. Wood, 1 My. & K. 403, it was'held by Sir
JOHN LEACH, Master of the Rolls, "that where a bond is given
by the borrower of a sum of stock, to secure the replacement of
the stock, and payment in the mean time of sums equal to the
interest and dividends, and a bonus is afterwards declared upn
the stock, the lender has an equity to be placed in the same situation as if the stock had remained in his hands, and is consequently
entitled to the replacement of the original stock increased by the
amount of the bongs,.iusl ,to the .dividends in the mean time as
well upon the bonus as upon the original stock:" Mayne on
Damages 83- (92"Law'Lib.).
. -In-Clark
V . Pinney,1 Cow. 687,,the courtsay, "Most
of-The
cases in which this principle has been adopted have grown out of
contracts for t.e .4livery And .replacem.eit of stock; and it is
believed there is no case to be found in JEngland, in which the
damages have been c6nfined to the value of the stock at the time
when it should havebeen replaced, where the action was brought
upon the contract itself,.and the question was distinctly presented
and passed upon by the courts, it appearifig affirmAtively that te
stock was subsequently of greater vKalue."
In Romaine v. -Van Allen, 12 Smith (26 N. Y.) 309, it was
held in a case here the trial was before a referee, and commenced on the 25th October 1861, and 'was concluded on the 25th
July 1862, in an action for the wrongful conversion of shares of
corporate stock, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
highest price ft had. reached between the time .of conversion and
the end of the trial. The price of the stock rose during the continuance of the trial from $5962 to $8175. It is clear, from the
language of the court, that the English measure. of damages, in
actions for refusal to replace or return borrowed stock, is approved
substantially by the Court of Appeals in New York. And this is

